Experiment 1 Aims
Using an emotional flanker task we investigated whether response-uninformative threat-related flankers would interfere with responses to central targets when such stimuli were images taken from the IAPS database.
Methods

Participants
Twenty healthy young volunteers with mean age of 24 (SD = 8) and average education of 15 (SD = 1) were recruited for this experiment. Participants were students enrolled in university courses who took part in the study on volunteer basis. None of them reported psychiatric or neurological problems. In the series of experiments reported here we recruited non-selected samples of undergraduate students who were not 8 chosen based on levels of anxiety. Previous power calculation run with data collected in a pilot study suggested that with samples of around 10 participants we could achieve over 90% power. We therefore aimed at sample sizes of around 20 subjects to control for the variability that could be introduced by the type of stimuli, tasks parameters, and individual differences (see Supplementary Material 1 and 3) . They all signed a consent form prior to participation. The study was approved by the University's Ethics Committees.
Task
The stimuli were pictures selected from the IAPS (Lang et al., 1988) . Sixty threatening and sixty neutral pictures were selected, according to the normative ratings for valence and arousal. To present the stimuli we created a layout similar to that used by the faces/house matching task (Bishop, Duncan, & Lawrence, 2004a; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001; Wojciulik, Kanwisher, & Driver, 1998) . In our task we presented a picture as a central stimulus instead of a fixation cross. This layout enables assessment of whether attention is shifted away from the central picture (target) when the surrounding pictures (4 flankers) show emotional information (see Figure 1A ).
Our task design also resembles the design of the flanker task devised by Eriksen and Eriksen (1974) and adapted by Horstmann and Bauland (2006) to investigate the attentional capture elicited by affective faces. The difference between our current design and that by Horstmann and Bauland (2006) is that in the current task flankers where all around the target rather than aligned to the left and to the right of the target.
If the surrounding stimuli can shift attention away from the focus, this effect would be stronger with the current layout as the distance between flankers and the target will always be the same. One other difference is that in the current task we presented images of real-life events rather than emotional faces. Figure 1A shows the layout used to present stimuli in the current task.
The stimuli were presented on a Personal Computer using an e-prime script devised for this study (Psychology Software Tools Inc., 1996) . Screen were placed 60 cm away from participants' eyes. At this viewing distance, the layout subtended 12 During the task, and at the beginning of each trial, participants were presented with a fixation cross for 1000 ms. The fixation screen was followed by a test display which presented the stimuli using the layout described above. The ratio for trials showing Target Neutral/Flanker Neutral // Target Threat/Flanker Threat and Target Neutral/Flanker Threat // Target Threat/Flanker Neutral was 50% each. The test display was presented for 1500 ms. Participants were requested to press a key of a standard keyboard of two previously allocated keys, as quickly and accurately as possible, depending on whether the central image showed a "Neutral" or a "Threatening" picture. There was then an inter-trial interval of 2000 ms during which responses were still recorded. Each of the sixty images was used twice as Targets and twice as Flankers. Six practice trials were followed by 240 test trials. Trials belonging to the four combinations described above were fully randomized across participants. Figure 1B shows the trial design of the current task.
Data analysis
The dependent variables were accuracy and response time (RT) which were recorded for each combination of pictures and entered to the analyses separately. However, initial analyses revealed no significant differences when accuracy was entered into the ANOVA model nor was there evidence of speed/accuracy trade-off. Therefore, the analysis presented here focused on RT as the dependent variable. Only correct responses were used to obtain mean RT. Careful inspection of the data (2 SD > mean) did not reveal outliers. A two-way repeated measure ANOVA was used. We label the It is worth noting that the effect of Position could also be interpreted as a Congruency effect (Horstmann et al., 2006) in so far as trials showing the "Same Emotion on both positions" would be "congruent" and those presenting "Different Emotions on each position" would be "incongruent" analysis the effect size was calculated using the Cohen's d (0.2 = small, 0.5 = medium, and 0.8 large) (Cohen, 1988) . Significant interactions were further assessed using paired-sample t-tests.
Results
Mean RT data is shown in Figure 2 . There was no effect of Position [F(1,19) 70, p=0.014; d=0.73) . Therefore, these results suggest that when images with threatening value were response uninformative (i.e., flankers), they slowed down responses to targets, an effect that was independent of the content of such targets. Hence, although response uninformative, threat-related flankers seem to be attentionally relevant.
Comments on Experiment 1
The results from Experiment 1 provide support to the hypothesis that responseuninformative threat-related flankers interfere with response-relevant central targets. Buetti, Lleras, and Moore, (2014) argued that the magnitude of such interference may reflect different types of processes e.g., the ability to keep attention on targets while we inhibit a response-related activity elicited by distractors (i.e., because flankers have also appeared as targets). Based on the authors' views, this may result from spatial biasing of response inhibition at the response selection stage (i.e., inhibitory processes fail due to the saliency of the flanker). This suggests that in the context of the flanker task, automatic and controlled process may operate in orchestra. However, the extent 14 to which the interplay of such attention mechanisms (i.e., automatic and controlled) mediated the interfering effect found in Experiment 1 would be difficult to disentangle from these data. It is possible that participants may have voluntarily looked at the threatening flankers. The stimulus presentation time was long enough as to allow for such voluntary shifts (overtly) of attention towards response-uninformative threatrelated flankers. In Experiment 2 we explored this hypothesis by reducing the presentation time to 1/3 of that used in Experiment 1. If the threat-related attentional bias seen in Experiment 1 was the result of such overt shifts of attention, thus suggesting a more voluntary response, it should not be observed under this new experimental manipulation.
Experiment 2 Aims
To investigate if the threat-related attentional bias observed in Experiment 1 resulted from the long presentation time of the stimuli which may have enabled voluntary shifts of attention towards the response-uninformative flankers.
Methods
Participants
A new sample of twenty healthy young volunteers with mean age of 22 (SD = 3) and average education of 16 (SD = 3) entered Experiment 2. Participants were students enrolled in University Courses who took part in the study on volunteer basis. None 15 of them reported psychiatric or neurological problems. None had taken part Experiment 1. They all signed a consent form prior to participation.
Task
The same task described in Experiment 1 was used in Experiment 2. The only difference was that in Experiment 2 the test display was presented for 500 ms (see Figure 1B) . The other task parameters remained the same as in Experiment 1. The same ANOVA model was used in the data analysis.
Results
There was a marginal effect of Position [F(1,19) 
Comments on Experiment 2
We predicted that if the threat-related attentional bias seen in Experiment 1 was the result of task allowances which permitted overt shifts of attention, such a response bias would disappear when such allowances are reduced. The results from Experiment 2 did not support this hypothesis. When the presentation time was reduced from 1500 ms to 500 ms, threatening pictures presented as responseuninformative flankers still significantly interfered with attention to central targets. Horstmann and Bauland (2006) found a similar effect using angry faces. Taken together these earlier findings and the findings from Experiments 1 and 2 we may suggest that the threat-related attentional bias is independent of the type stimuli that compete for attention and of time these stimuli remain available on the visual field.
This reinforces the view that the threat-related attentional bias is a robust, automatic, adaptive mechanism (see Calvo et al., 2006) . The robustness of such an effect is further supported by the outcomes from these experiments as stimuli presented as flankers are part of the attention set which are also linked to responses and yet they automatically captured attention (see Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994 
Experiment 3 Aims
To investigate whether visual interference, as imposed by the nature of the information competing for attention, would account for the threat-related attentional bias observed in Experiments 1 and 2 and for the reduction of such a response bias found in the latter experiment. We subjected this hypothesis to investigation in conditions where the possibility to overtly allocate attentional resources to responseuninformative flankers was further controlled by reducing the presentation time to 200 ms.
Methods
Participants
Twenty seven new healthy young volunteers with mean age of 22 (SD = 3) and average education of 14 (SD = 1) entered Experiment 3. Participants were University students who took part in the study on volunteer basis. None of them reported psychiatric or neurological problems. None had taken part Experiments 1 or 2 or in related pilots studies. They all signed a consent form prior to participation.
Task
For Experiment 3 we used the same task structure described in Experiments 1 and 2 (see Figure 1C) . Affective pictures were presented together with line drawings of objects belonging to two categories, living (e.g., cat) and non-living (e.g., broom). Neutral trials. We compared these scores across Experiments using a one-way ANOVA model. We also calculated the effect size (Cohen's d) of the discrepancies yielding these scores.
Results
Mean RT data is shown in Figure 4A . There was a significantly large effect of Position (1) faster RT when targets are threatening compared to when they are neutral (in both cases flanked by Objects) and 2) slower RT when Objects are flanked by threatening than by neutral images. Of note, such an effect held even when images were presented for only 200 ms.
The results from the analysis of the Emotional Interference Score are shown in .04, p=ns) . The effect size of the discrepancies yielding these scores (see analysis above) decreased from Experiment 1 to 2 and remained stable in Experiment 3. Figure 4 A and B about here
General Discussion
This study was set out to investigate whether the threat-related attentional bias reported in the literature could be observed with an emotional flanker task that (1) simultaneously presented response-relevant (targets) and response-uninformative stimuli (flankers) which competed for attention, (2) that manipulated both the exposure time of the stimuli and the nature of the information competing for attention, and (3) that was applied to subjects not preselected on anxiety levels. Based on these experimental manipulations we predicted that the emotional flanker task presented here would shed light on the mechanisms and processes of attention involved in the threat-related attentional bias as well as on the time course of this effect. Our key findings indicate that response-uninformative flankers presenting threat-related information do interfere with response-relevant targets across a range of presentation times which posed different constraints on overt attention mechanisms. Moreover, such an effect was found regardless of the nature of the information presented by these competing stimuli. We discuss the implications of these findings in turn.
The emotional flanker task presented here offers a rather naturalistic approach to investigate the well-known threat-related attentional bias. This task presents information competing for attention in a way akin to daily living experiences. When navigating crowded spaces, our visual system is constantly bombarded with inputs which we filter and process online extracting meaningful information which holds survival value. The emotional flanker task assesses the individuals' ability to keep attention on targets while they inhibit the influence of threat-related flankers. In a series of experiments we found that healthy subjects not preselected on anxiety levels display a threat-related attentional bias whether or not the time images remain visible enable shifting attention overtly. This suggests that such an adaptive response is triggered by automatic mechanisms which can then activate top-down functions responsible for orientating attention (see Calvo et al., 2006) . Zhou and Liu (2013) proposed that emotion processing can be influenced both by attentionally controlled and automatic mechanisms. Here we show that the influence of threat-related stimuli is completely unrelated to what a person is gazing at (Folk et al., 1994) . In the series of experiments presented here and in the pilot study shown in Supplementary Material 1, we have demonstrated that it would not matter whether we are gazing at coloured doors, line drawings of objects from different semantic categories, or real life scenes.
As long as the distracting information holds threatening value, it would disrupt attention significantly. We have also shown that the threat-related bias observed with the emotional flanker task reported here does not seem to be accounted for by the different cognitive demands of the stimuli competing for attention (see The analysis of the Emotional Interference Score provided interesting clues about the mechanisms subserving the threat-related attentional bias. The effect was larger when images from IAPS competed for attention in conditions of long presentation times. When the presentation time was severely reduced, the magnitude of the effect dropped but it remained significant regardless of the nature of the information competing for attention. This temporal constancy of the threat-related attentional bias has been previously found in non-clinical anxiety samples using words rather than real life scenes presented in an attentional cueing paradigm (Mogg, Bradley, de Bono, & Painter, 1997) . However, the attentional cueing paradigm not always seems to yield these outcomes. Using natural scenes from IAPS as cues, Koster et al. (2007) reported the threat-related attentional bias only when they were presented for 100 ms but not for shorter (28 ms) or longer (200 or 500 ms) periods of time.
Therefore, the attentional cueing paradigm seems to be sensitive to the nature of the cueing information, a feature not shared by the emotional flanker task reported here.
We observed the attentional bias with presentation times similar to those used by Mogg et al. (1997) . A potential reason for the robustness of the effect found with the emotional flanker task may be the way the attentional bias is elicited by this task.
Whereas the attentional cueing paradigm probes processes responsible for the engagement/disengagement of attention, the emotional flanker task probes the mechanisms responsible for orienting attention in conditions of interference. That is, it informs about the outputs of the competition between top-down and bottom-up mechanisms. The former facilitates attentional engagement towards Targets and inhibits attentional shifts towards response-irrelevant flankers whereas the latter drives attention towards response-uninformative flankers due to the saliency of the emotional information competing for attention (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Faucher & Tappolet, 2002; Zhou & Liu, 2013) . Another interesting aspect to highlight from the Emotional Interference Score is the observation that such score did not differ between Experiments 2 and 3. In the introduction of Experiment 3, we predicted that reducing visual interference (Experiments 1 and 2: Targets and Flankers all from IAPS images; Experiment 3: IAPS images competed with line drawing of objects -see also Supplementary Material 1 and 2) would enhance the threat-related effect even if the demands imposed by temporal constraints were further increased. Our data suggest that by making the competing stimuli perceptually more distinct but reducing their encoding time, the emotional flanker task yields Emotional Interference Scores similar to those found in conditions where the task presents less perceptually distinct stimuli which can be encoded for longer.
Finally, in addition to the temporal constancy of the threat-related attentional bias elicited by the emotional flanker task we also observed a stimulus-invariance property of this effect. The threat-related attentional bias has been reproduced with a wide variety of threatening stimuli such as pictures, faces, objects, or electrodermal conditioning (Fox & Damjanovic, 2006; Fox et al., 2007; Koster et al., 2004; Ohman & Dimberg, 1978) . However, tasks traditionally used to investigate the attentional bias to emotional stimuli (e.g., attentional cueing tasks, faces/house matching task) were not designed to assess competition for attention between central targets and peripheral flankers (e.g., Bishop, 2008; Koster et al. 2004 a & b; MacLeod et al., 1986; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Wojciulik et al., 1998) 
Task
The structure of the task used in this pilot study is the same to that described in 
Results
Mean RT data is shown in Supplementary Figure 2, =2.73, p=0.013; d=0.20) . Target Neutral/Flanker Door trials attracted slower responses than Target Threat/ Flanker Door (t(25) = 2.95, p=0.007; d=0.13).
Supplementary Figure 2.
Mean RT data from the Pilot Experiment.
Comments on the pilot data
These results revealed the effect that was further investigated in the series of experiments presented in the manuscript. In the context of this supplementary information it is used to support the view that interference between competing 43 information should not be the mechanism underlying the threat-related attentional bias observed in our experimental series nor could it be attributed to mapping responses to specific keys. When the threat-related stimuli presented as flankers competed with drawing of coloured doors, the threat-related attentional bias further explored in this series of experiments was observed. However, due to the high frequency of presentation of the stimuli within the colour category, this pilot data alone cannot entirely rule out some form of categorical association between colouremotion. This possibility was further investigated in Experiment 3.
Supplementary Material 2
Assessing task demands across stimulus categories (Doors vs IAPS Images / Objects vs IAPS Images)
Doors vs IAPS Images (Pilot Experiment)
To investigate whether the two tasks (door-based decisions and IAPS images -based decisions) differ in their cognitive demands we compared accuracy data from trials Target Door/Flanker Threat vs Target Threat/ Flanker Door and Target Door/ Flanker Neutral vs. Target Neutral/Flanker Door. None of these contrasts proved significant (t(25) = 1.87, p=0.072; d=0.31 and t(25) = 0.0, p=1.00; d=0.00, respectively).
Objects vs IAPS Images (Experiment 3 of the manuscript)
44
As for doors, we also subjected line drawings of objects to the same query. We 
Comments
This pattern of performance based on accuracy data suggests that different levels of cognitive demands as informed by Object/Door based decision relative to IAPS images based decisions would unlikely explain the relevant interactions described in the series of experiments reported in our manuscript. It is worth remembering that the patterns of interaction reported in these experiments were driven by response time not by accuracy.
Supplementary Material 3
Power and Sample Size Calculation
